

# Cross-Border M&A and the Exchange Rate: Evidence from Switzerland

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### Summary


- I exploit the natural experiment induced by the Swiss National Bank in January 2015.
- I find evidence that a sudden, sizeable, and persistent appreciation of the local currency is associated with reduced cross-border M&A activity targeting domestic firms, relative to comparable countries.
- Further, I find a larger effect for high-technology firms.

## Research question

• Does a **link** exist between the **cross-border** merger and acquisition (**M&A**) activity and the **exchange rate**?

# 

January 15, **2015**, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) communicates the **repeal** of the **minimum exchange rate** of 1.20 Swiss Francs (CHF) per Euro inducing an almost instantaneous 18.5% **appreciation** of the **CHF**.



Replication of Efing et al.'s (2016) Fig. 2, values standardized as of 15.08.2014 Source: Bloomberg

The exchange rate **shock** is **sizeable** and **persistent**; market participants did not anticipate it (**exogenous**).

## Anecdotal evidence

- As per the Cass MARC M&A Attractiveness Index, Switzerland **drops** from 9<sup>th</sup> place in 2014 to 18<sup>th</sup> in 2015.
- The 2015 Clarity on Mergers & Acquisitions report published by KPMG states that, **despite global** records, 2015 was a bumpy M&A year for Switzerland.

# Empirical literature

• There is **mixed evidence** in the literature regarding the link between cross-border M&A and the exchange rate.

# Blonigen's (1997) model

• A link exists when firms are endowed with **firm-specific assets** (e.g., process technology, product innovation) that are **not location specific** and can therefore generate returns in foreign currencies (vs. "bond-like" assets).

## Novelty

Unique framework to test Blonigen's (1997) model:

- Short time vs. long-term exchange rate movement: it reduces the incidence of potential confounding factors.
- Local currency appreciation vs. depreciation.
- Extremely **innovative country**: Switzerland ranks first in both *The Global Innovation Index* 2014 and 2015. Moreover, it exhibits the highest number of patent applications and R&D personnel per million inhabitants, relative to comparable countries.


## Hypotheses

- **H1**: The appreciation of the domestic currency leads to reduced cross-border M&A activity targeting local firms.
- **H2**: The shock affects the cross-border acquisitions of domestic high-technology companies more substantially.

#### Data

- M&A transactions involving firms registered in Switzerland (CHE) and in the following control countries. Observation dropped if target country = acquirer country (cross-border deals) and if acquirer country = CHE (simultaneity bias). Source: Bloomberg.
- Control countries: **neighbouring countries** (based on the literature on cross-border M&A's determinants) and continental Europe **G-10 members** (based on criteria of regional proximity and economic comparability).

## Summary statistics



Consistently with KPMG's statement about 2015 global records, the chart shows that the number of cross-border M&As targeting domestic firms significantly **increases** in all the selected **countries but Switzerland**.

## Methodology - Difference-in-differences


 $n_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A f ter_t + \beta_2 T reated_i + \beta_3 T reated_i \cdot A f ter_t + \epsilon_{it}$ 

- Dependent variable: monthly **number of** announced cross-border **transactions** targeting local firms.
- Time window: 1 year before and after the shock.
- After: dummy equal to 1 after January 15, 2015.
- Treated: dummy equal to 1 if the target firm is registered in Switzerland.
- Country fixed effects to absorb time-invariant observed and unobserved heterogeneity across countries.

## Methodology - Synthetic control method

- Data-driven extension of the traditional DiD framework.
- Synthetic Switzerland: **weighted average** of (control) countries from the donor pool **that best matches**, both in terms of **pre-treatment** (3 years) covariates and outcome variable, the characteristics of Switzerland.
- Covariates: macroeconomic, stock market, and firm-level variables. "Bad controls" could also be employed.

## Results - Difference-in-differences



The coefficient of interest controlling for country fixed effects reveals that, after the exchange rate shock, the **average change** in the number of cross-border M&As targeting local firms is about **2 units** per month **smaller** in Switzerland than in the control countries.

### Results - Synthetic control method

- The country weights in the synthetic Switzerland are the following: 0.765 BEL, 0.141 FRA, 0.094 NLD.
- The **pre- minus post-** treatment **difference** between means amounts to **-2.022**.
- Switzerland exhibits the smallest root of the preintervention mean squared prediction error.

## Economic meaning

- 2012-2014 average announced value of cross-border **M&As** targeting Swiss firms: \$485.09 million.
- 2015 **FDI inflows** in Switzerland: \$115,891.60 million.
- -2 · \$485.09 million · 12 = -\$11,642.16 million.
- -\$11,642.16 million / \$115,891.60 million  $\approx$  -10%
- 10% should be interpreted as the **upper bound**, since the value of (smaller) private deals is not always disclosed.


## Robustness tests

- Placebo tests falsely assuming that the treatment took place in the control countries. ✓
- **Placebo** test falsely assuming that the treatment took place in the middle of the "peg" **period**. ✓
- Control for volatility to make sure not to be measuring the increased economic uncertainty. ✓

## High-technology firms

- I follow Kile and Phillips's (2009) procedure to sample high-technology firms based on the SIC codes.
- I find evidence that the **reduced** cross-border M&A **activity** is mostly driven by high-technology firms.

Fig. 4: Transactions involving high-technology firms



The chart shows that the ratio of cross-border M&A transactions targeting **high-technology** firms is significantly **higher in Switzerland** than in the control countries. This supports the anecdotal evidence that Swiss firms are endowed with **firm-specific assets**.

## Contacts